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THE OPTIMAL USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW
SHAI DOTHAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the arguments for the use of comparative law by national courts is that
learning from the experience of other nations can improve the quality of the legal
decisions made by national courts. This argument has been advanced by Eric
Posner and Cass Sunstein] using the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which proposes that
if a decision is made by a number of independent "jurors," that decision is likely to
be a correct decision-and, therefore, a decision worth following.2  Applied to
comparative law, the theorem suggests that if a number of individual states reach
the same legal decision, that decision is probably a correct decision and, therefore,
a decision worth following.
Yet there is a problem with this argument, as Posner and Sunstein themselves
acknowledge: if states learn from each other's law, their decisions are no longer
independent and therefore the theorem's condition of independent "jurors" is no
longer met.3 In fact, in learning from states in other parts of the world, states may
fall prey to information cascades in which they harmfully follow each other's lead
without analyzing any new information. With that risk in mind, Posner and
Sunstein argue that states who want to support the global interest and provide new
information on how to improve the law should not imitate others.4 But while
Posner and Sunstein's framework answers the problem of information cascades, it
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1. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 136
(2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 163.
4. Id. at 163-164.
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does so at the expense of maximizing the benefits to be gained from comparative
law-namely, allowing all states to learn from each other's experiences.
5
This paper suggests an alternative framework, one which recovers the benefits
of comparative law without risking the development of information cascades. At
the heart of this alternative framework is the doctrine of Emerging Consensus,
currently used by the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"). Under this
doctrine, the ECHR examines whether a particular practice has been outlawed by a
critical number of states; if so, the ECHR declares that practice to have violated the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the
Convention").6 In other words, the ECHR aggregates the preferences of a wide
range of states, each of which has already made an independent decision. The
resulting rule allows for the benefits of comparative law-because all states can
then adopt the ECHR's rule-without the risk of information cascades, since the
rule was based on the "emerging consensus" of states who had already made their
decisions independently.
The remainder of this paper examines the benefits of the Emerging Consensus
framework and proposes solutions for the obstacles facing international and
regional courts who might wish to apply it-namely, that strategic behavior by
states may prevent these courts from reaching good decisions and that these courts
may have other motivations, which prevent them from directly applying Emerging
Consensus.
To set up this examination, Part II introduces the argument for the use of
comparative law by national courts, noting both the position advanced by Posner
and Sunstein as well as the problem of information cascades. Part III then outlines
the doctrine of Emerging Consensus and Part IV explains why implementing the
doctrine may facilitate better decision-making than simply relying on national
courts to use comparative law. Part V suggests doctrinal tools that can ensure the
successful use of Emerging Consensus. Part VI addresses the problem of states
engaging in strategic behavior that can hinder the effective use of Emerging
Consensus and offers some solutions to this problem. Part VII addresses the
problem of regional and international courts like the ECHR possibly having
motivations other than applying Emerging Consensus correctly. Part VIII
concludes by highlighting some of the institutional advantages of international
courts over national courts.
1I. THE ARGUMENT FOR THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY NATIONAL COURTS
A. Posner and Sunstein's Argument
Posner and Sunstein start from the intuition that states can learn from each
other's experience and use the decisions of other nations to improve their own.
7
5. 1d.
6. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 222.
7. Posner & Sunstein, supra note I, at 136.
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They use the Jury Theorem, originally invented by the 18th century French
philosopher Nicolas de Condorcet, to discipline this intuition.8 The Jury Theorem
is a simple mathematical model that suggests that if a series of jurors decide by
majority vote between two answers-one of which is false and the other true-and
every juror has a probability of more than 50% to reach the correct result, then the
greater the number of jurors, the more likely it is that the decision of the group will
be correct.9 As the size of the group increases, the chances of reaching the correct
result approaches 100%.'o
Posner and Sunstein synthesize three conditions that are necessary for the
practice of comparative law to lead to good results under the Jury Theorem.'1
First, the decisions of the foreign states must sincerely reflect their choices, which
are based on private information. 12 Second, the foreign states must be sufficiently
similar to make learning from them useful.13 Third, the foreign states must have
decided independently, rather than mimicking the decisions of other states. 14
Posner and Sunstein indicate when these conditions are likely to hold and when
they are unlikely to hold.15 They argue that following the Jury Theorem can often
lead to superior results on factual questions, such as which penalty system would
prevent crime more effectively, as well as on moral questions, such as which
penalty system is morally justified.'6 This paper will focus on the third condition
for the applicability of the theory-the requirement that the decisions of different
nations must be independent from each other.
B. The Limitations of National Courts
Under the framework presented by Posner and Sunstein, national courts
should learn from the experiences of other national courts because these other
courts made their decisions based on valuable information. ' 7 But if national courts
mimic each other and do not decide independently, their decisions do not reveal
any new information as to what is the correct result.' 8 Courts that follow each
8. Id.
9. Id. at 141.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 144.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. ld. at 144-45.
15. Id. at pts. II-IV.
16. ld. at 149-54.
17. National courts may follow the decisions of other legal bodies, besides courts, within foreign
states, such as the parliament's statutes or even the executive's decisions and regulations. Similarly
parliaments or executives may choose to follow the judgments of foreign national courts as they set
policy. Because in many of the situations discussed by the ECHR, which deals with the interpretation of
the limits of protection of human rights, national courts are the ultimate arbitrator within the state and in
the interest of simplicity, the paper refers interchangeably to the decision of national courts and of
states.
18. This problem maybe less severe if courts do not just follow each other but instead try to learn
from the arguments used by other courts. But this is a different use of comparative law than the one
studied by Posner and Sunstein. See infra note 255 and accompanying text. Any reference to
2014
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other's decision may form a "cascade." Posner and Sunstein distinguish between
two kinds of cascades-reputational nd informational.'9 A reputational cascade is
formed when decision makers follow each other not because they think this will
lead to a better result, but because they are afraid that their reputation will be
damaged if they decide differently from the others.20 An informational cascade is
formed when decision makers try to learn from the decisions of others in an
attempt to improve their own decisions, but because each decision maker followed
other decision makers, no individual decision provides any new information.
21
Reputational cascades may or may not occur depending on states' interests.
Informational cascades, however, pose a much greater challenge to Posner and
Sunstein's argument, which they clearly acknowledge. Posner and Sunstein's
normative claim is that courts should learn from each other in order to reach better
results; but if all courts learn from each other, their decisions are not independent
and other courts should not learn from them.2 This framework, therefore, fails to
provide a universal rule that can guide courts on how to make good decisions.
If courts in different states tend to behave differently from each other, Posner
and Sunstein's framework can still lead to some valuable normative suggestions.
For instance, if some courts are known to decide independently, other courts can
learn from these independent choices in order to improve their own decisions. On
the other hand, the more courts that follow this suggestion, the lower the quality of
information other courts can obtain from looking to comparative law, since fewer
courts would decide independently. Therefore, courts who want to help other
courts make good decisions should not follow the decisions of other courts-but if
all courts were not to follow others, no one will gain the benefits of relying on
comparative law.23 If states clearly diverge in their use of comparative law, a
stable equilibrium may theoretically be reached in which some states decide
independently and other states learn from their experience. But, if states differ
from each other in their propensity to apply comparative law, they may be different
in other respects as well. If states are fundamentally different, they should not
learn from each other since they are not sufficiently similar to comply with the
conditions of the Jury Theorem.24
comparative law in this paper is only to the act of following the law adopted by a majority of foreign
states or national courts, even though there are many other potential uses of comparative law (for
example, courts can learn from the decision of a minority of courts because it is based on valid
arguments or use comparative law only as an inspiration to find ways to improve their doctrine).
19. Posner & Sunstein, supra note I, at 161.
20. Id. at 162-63.
21. Id. at 161-62.
22. Id. at 163.
23. Id. at 164.
24. The decision to apply comparative law is a second-degree doctrinal choice-it chooses a
method on how to choose what law will apply in certain conditions. Nevertheless it is still a doctrinal
choice and therefore the logic presented by Posner and Sunstein applies to it, namely, states can learn
from the decisions of other states on the question whether to use comparative law. If states will imitate
each other's decision on whether to apply comparative law, all states will either apply comparative
law-leading to an information cascade, or decide not to apply comparative law, in which case its
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If national courts do not just follow the final decisions reached by other states,
but instead try to evaluate the ultimate reasons that led to those states' decisions,
then national courts may be able to discern whether the states' decisions reflect
new information or whether they are simply an imitation of the decisions of other
states. If the court can expose all the relevant arguments on the subject, however,
there is no real need for it to follow the majority of states-the court can simply
assess the arguments according to their own merits. The problem is that often the
real grounds for the decisions of other courts or states and the information that
guided it are hidden or unclear.25
To a certain extent, many states probably exercise some measure of
independent discretion when they decide to adopt a legal regime, or at least when
they decide to adhere to it after it was adopted. Because informational cascades do
not occur immediately, states may have time to test legal regimes independently
and render learning from their experience a fruitful exercise. Under these
conditions, national courts can gain some informational advantage from
comparative law. International courts, however, can sometimes exceed these
benefits. They can set a doctrine that, if followed by all states, will prevent
informational cascades altogether. This paper argues that this is one way to
account for the doctrine of Emerging Consensus applied by the ECHR.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF EMERGING CONSENSUS
The Emerging Consensus doctrine directs the ECHR to consider current
views on human rights protection as it interprets the Convention.26 There are three
common interpretations of the doctrine: (1) as a direction to the ECHR to follow
the laws of European states, (2) as a direction to the ECHR to follow the views of
experts, (3) and as a direction to the ECHR to consider the views of the European
public.27 According to recent empirical evidence, the ECHR in fact applies a
version of the first interpretation of the doctrine-if the majority of European
states protect a certain human right, the ECHR will read the Convention as
ensuring protection of this right and will find states that infringe this right in
violation of the Convention.
28
Emerging Consensus allows the ECHR to learn from the experience of
European states and follow what seems to be the norm among the majority of these
benefits will not be realized. States can be different from each other in their propensity to use
comparative law, for instance some national courts will not have the facilities to conduct comparative
research and will therefore make independent decisions. Other states may learn from these decisions,
but only if they are sufficiently similar to the condition of that state. If a state is unable to conduct
comparative research it may also be poor or underdeveloped, for instance, lowering the benefit of any
attempt of more developed states to learn from its decisions.
25. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 146, 164.
26. See Laurence R. Heifer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human
Rights, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 133, 139-140 (1993).
27. Id. at 139.
28. Laurence R. Heifer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence
from LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT'L ORG. 77, 106 (2014).
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states. This norm will then be applied to all states, which then must adhere to the
new standard of human rights protection discovered by the ECHR. The doctrine is
a key tool that allows the ECHR to interpret the Convention in an evolutionary
manner, which improves human rights protection over time, because it allows the
ECHR to follow progressive tendencies within European States.
29
Emerging Consensus implies that the ECHR should strive to harmonize how
human rights are protected in different states in Europe. The doctrine is balanced,
however, by an underlying principle of the convention system-the principle of
subsidiarity. This principle implies that states should be given leeway to decide
the degree of protection they grant to different human rights.30  This leeway is
reflected in another doctrine adopted by the ECHR-the Margin of Appreciation.
The Margin of Appreciation directs the ECHR to defer to the state's decision and
not to find it in violation of the Convention, unless the violation of the right
exceeds a certain latitude of choice granted to the states.31 The greater the degree
of European consensus that a certain right should be protected, however, the
narrower will be the willingness of the ECHR to defer to the state, and the
narrower the latitude of choice it will be granted under the Margin of Appreciation
doctrine.
32
IV. THE BENEFIT OF EMERGING CONSENSUS-PREVENTING CASCADES
Emerging Consensus allows the ECHR to learn from the experience of all
European states. The ECHR can use this doctrine to find out what the majority of
states in Europe choose to set as their laws. According to the Jury Theorem, this
majority approach is likely to be a good legal solution.33  After the ECHR
discovers this legal solution, it can set it as a standard that all European states must
follow; otherwise, the ECHR will find them in violation of the Convention. In
order for the ECHR to gain the most information from the laws of different
European states, these states should decide independently from each other and only
conform to the ECHR's judgment after it was given.
34
29. See Helfer, supra note 26, at 134; Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 31, 1 31 (1978)
(stating the ECHR should interpret the Convention according to present conditions including the current
laws in European states).
30. See Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany, Introduction to THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF
AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 1,
6 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany, eds., 2008), available at
xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/23157333/794364126/name/shitfting.
31. See Dickson v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 177.
32. See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards, 31 NYU J.
INT'L L. & POL. 843, 851 (1999); Heifer, supra note 26, at 140.
33. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 136.
34. If each of the states chooses between more than two options the majority's decision may lack
transitivity. This problem and ways to resolve it are discussed in Lewis A. Komhauser & Lawrence G.
Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 107-110 (1986). It will not be discussed further here.
See Shai Dothan, Comparative Views on the Right to Vote in International Law: The Case of Prisoners'
Disenfranchisement, in COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Anthea Roberts et al. eds, Forthcoming
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States may not want to decide independently for their own reasons, some of
which are discussed in Part VI. Similarly, the ECHR may fail to apply Emerging
Consensus correctly for its own reasons, some of which are discussed in Part VII.
These parts also suggest ways to counter these problems. Emerging Consensus has
a key advantage over the use of comparative law by national courts, however. It
provides a universal rule that can lead to optimal results if followed by the ECHR
and the states-that is, if states decide independently and the ECHR applies
Emerging Consensus correctly. Because under Emerging Consensus as it is
presented here states should decide independently, an informational cascade is
prevented. Because the ECHR learns from the experience of the states and applies
the majority's decision across Europe, the benefits of the Jury Theorem are fully
realized.
In contrast, no universal rule can guide national courts that apply comparative
law themselves. If they learn from each other, they will create an informational
cascade; if they do not learn from each other, they will not realize the benefits of
the Jury Theorem. Because only a universal rule can be applied by courts without
them bearing prohibitive costs to uncover the decision-making processes of every
other foreign court, the doctrine of Emerging Consensus is better than the
application of comparative law by national courts. It guides all states in a way that
can lead to optimal results if followed by those states.35
V. MECHANISMS TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF EMERGING CONSENSUS
If all the states in Europe have the same propensity to adopt good laws and if
the ECHR is able to survey all of their national laws, the best results under the Jury
Theorem will be achieved by following the majority of states. Yet, these two
conditions will often not apply. Some states may be more likely to make good law
than others and the ECHR may be able to study only the laws of a limited number
of states because of its limited resources. Under these constraints, the ECHR
should try to survey only the laws of states that are likely to make better law, or at
least try to give their laws greater weight.
Oxford Univ. Press 2015) (analyzing situations in which this problem should limit the use of the
Emerging Consensus Doctrine).
35. Posner and Sunstein address the issue of decisions by international courts and even speak
specifically about the ECHR but without discussing Emerging Consensus. Their paper views the
decision of the international court as reflecting the agreement of states that ratified the treaty which
formed the court. If many states ratified the treaty they argue that this should count as a vote of many
states which is likely to be correct under the Jury Theorem. If states joined the treaty for ulterior
reasons that have nothing to do with a mutual choice to adopt a specific rule and if the ECHR decides
based on the views of the judges instead of the prescriptions in the treaty then the decision of the ECHR
should count for less than a vote of all the states in Europe. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at
165-166. The theory presented here, however, does not focus on the agreement of states to join the
treaty, but on the ability of the ECHR to learn from the individual decisions of all European states under
Emerging Consensus. It therefore does not suffer from the shortcomings presented by Posner and
Sunstein.
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If the ECHR judges choose which states to learn from, they may manipulate
this choice according to the result they want to reach.36 However, to the extent that
the ECHR judges do not manipulate their choice, but rather try to learn as much as
they can from the states, choosing to survey the laws of only a few states may be
very efficient, because under the Jury Theorem the informational value added from
each new state surveyed declines steeply as the number of surveyed states
increases.37 If the ECHR already surveyed a substantial number of states for a
particular case, it can gain very little from looking at the laws of even more states.
If the ECHR wants to make as many good choices as possible under a resource
constraint, it should survey a few states in as many cases as possible, instead of
surveying all states in only a few cases.
Posner and Sunstein argue that national courts that cannot survey the laws of
all states should focus on states that provide their populations with the highest
standards of living, as those states are more likely to make better laws.38 The
ECHR can similarly rely on the relative success of states when it decides which
states should count more for the purpose of identifying an Emerging Consensus. It
may be very problematic, however, to decide what factors are the most relevant to
judge the success of states. Should the happiness of the population be more
important than the strength of the economy? Should the protection of political
rights matter more than the protection of social rights? Furthermore, the position
of the ECHR is especially difficult compared to that of national courts that apply
comparative law. National courts make decisions that affect their own states and
are under no obligation not to discriminate between the states that they learn from.
The ECHR judgments set human rights standards for all of Europe39 and if the
ECHR appears biased in favor or against learning from the laws of certain states,
this can seriously damage its legitimacy. Therefore, the ECHR may have to hide
the fact that it gives greater weight to the laws of certain states and use its legal
reasoning to give the impression that the laws of all states are treated equally.
Bearing in mind that the ECHR may have to conceal the fact that it gives
different weights to the laws of different states, it may want to consider other
factors when it decides on these relative weights. One important factor is the
nature of the state's political system. Democracies, for example, often make
decisions by majority rule and involve a large group of decision makers, either
directly or through representative organizations. Therefore, according to the logic
that underlies the Jury Theorem, their decisions are more likely to be correct than
those of non-democracies.40 A similar conclusion can be reached without the Jury
Theorem, as many consider democracy the best system of government because of
its ability to restrain corruption by checks and balancesa.4  Another important
factor is the size of the state. Democracies with bigger populations integrate the
36. See infra Part VII.
37. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 169.
38. See id. at 174-75.
39. See Kamer v. Austria, 2003-1X Eur. Ct. H.R. 199, 126.
40. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 159.
41. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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wisdom of more people than less populous democracies. Their decisions should
therefore usually be better according to the Jury Theorem. More populous states
face greater legal coordination challenges and may be able to invest more
resources in improving their laws. These are additional reasons why their laws
should be given a greater weight.
The ECHR can distinguish between the laws of different states not only by
the different qualities of the state itself but also by the quality of the process that
led to a specific legal rule. If a law was adopted after a long and serious
deliberation, the ECHR may want to pay special attention to it when it discovers an
Emerging Consensus, as it is more likely to be a good law. If a law seems to gain
the approval of a substantial majority of the population within a state, it is more
likely to be correct than a law that was accepted by a narrow margin. Certain laws
and certain legal issues may be very salient in some states, but considered
unimportant in other states.42 States that view a certain law as especially important
should be given more weight. A more problematic situation arises when one state
recently changed its laws to deal with a certain issue while another state deals with
the same issue based on an old legal provision. It may be beneficial to give the
more veteran law a greater weight because the state that uses it probably applied it
successfully for a long time without a need for a revision. On the other hand, the
new law, even if it was not actually tested, was adopted after a recent deliberation
that took current conditions into account. The relative merits of the test of time
and of fresh deliberation probably differ across different issues.
Emerging Consensus retreats when the state's practices are given a Margin of
Appreciation.43 The boundaries of the Margin of Appreciation allotted to the state
exceed the realms of this paper.44 Nevertheless, the considerations mentioned
above for giving a greater weight to the state's decisions when finding an
Emerging Consensus support the conclusion that the state made good law and
therefore also militate in favor of granting it a larger Margin of Appreciation. As a
result, the ECHR should be more careful not to find violations in states that are
democratic and populous, that reach a decision based on a careful deliberation and
by a substantial majority, and that view the relevant issue as especially salient.
If a certain state in Europe is fundamentally different from the others in a way
that is relevant to the legal issue at stake, its legal choices provide the ECHR with
42. See Frederick Schauer, Forward: The Court's Agenda and the Nation's, 120 HARv. L. REV. 4,
14-20 (2006) (suggesting empirical methods to establish what are the most salient issues on a nation's
agenda-the issues discussed on the first page of major newspapers and public opinion polls).
43. See supra, Part Ill.
44. See generally Benvenisti, supra note 32 (arguing that states should be granted a narrower
margin of appreciation when they suffer from democratic failures and do not properly represent their
citizens); Andreas von Staden, The Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review Beyond the State, 10
INT'L J. CONST. L. 1023, 1042 (2012) (arguing that the ECHR actually does grant a larger margin of
appreciation to states with well-functioning democratic mechanisms); Shai Dothan, Three Interpretive
Constraints on the European Court of Human Rights, in THE RULE OF LAW AT THE NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LEVELS: CONTESTATIONS AND DEFERENCE (Machiko Kanetake & Andr6
Nollkaemper, eds.) (forthcoming 2014) (explaining when the ECHR should follow Margin of
Appreciation, the text of the Convention, and Emerging Consensus).
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little information about the appropriate legal rule for the rest of Europe. Such a
state violates the similarity condition that underlies the Jury Theorem's logic. The
ECHR should give less weight to the choices of this state when it shapes Emerging
Consensus. At the same time, however, the experience gained from other
European states may not be relevant for the unique conditions this state faces-it
should therefore be granted a larger Margin of Appreciation.
For example, in the Sahin case,45 a female Muslim student, who viewed it as
her religious duty to wear a headscarf, argued that the regulations in a Turkish
university that forbade her from wearing the headscarf violated her freedom of
religion protected by the Convention.46 She argued that no single other European
country forbids the wearing of headscarves at universities, and, therefore, an
overwhelming consensus against Turkey's practices exists in Europe.47 Yet the
ECHR decided that Turkey is too different from the other states to merit requiring
it to conform to the European consensus.48 Turkey is inhabited predominantly by
Muslims, it has a unique history of secularism, and it fears the rise of Islamic
extremists.49 All these facts set Turkey apart from the rest of Europe. Thus,
because Turkey is different than the other states in Europe, it was granted a Margin
of Appreciation and was not found in violation.5 °
By the same logic, one can also argue that the practices of Turkey should not
be considered when determining European consensus on issues that pertain to
religious rights. Turkey's problems regarding issues that deal with religion are
simply too different from the ones faced by the rest of Europe, which renders
learning from Turkey in these matters a useless exercise. In fact, the ECHR noted
in the Sahin case that attitudes towards religious symbols are diverse across all of
Europe, implying that this is an issue in which differences between all European
states are relatively large.51 In such issues, where European states are dissimilar,
the adoption of the same policy by the majority of the states in Europe does not
necessarily indicate that it is a good policy. States may fare better under different
policies due to the large differences between them.
VI. How STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR BY STATES CAN INTERFERE
For all European states to gain the maximum benefit from Emerging
Consensus, each of the states must decide independently. Under certain
conditions, however, states may not decide independently and choose to serve a
different, conflicting interest.
One reason that states may fail to decide independently is that the laws
adopted in one state can create externalities on other states. If the laws adopted by
45. Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 178.




50. Id. 1 114-23. See also Id. 1 3 (Judge Tulkens, dissenting) (rejecting the use of the Margin of
Appreciation).
51. Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 178, 1 109.
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one state damage the interests of another state, the second state may respond by
adopting legal regimes that prevent this damage, even if the laws do not promote
the state's interest when considered in isolation. Alternatively, if states can gain
by conforming to the laws adopted by other states, they may change their laws
from what suits their isolated interests in order to coordinate with other states.
These types of problems may prevent states from deciding independently. Such
problems are relevant to many areas of the law, but they are usually less acute in
regards to issues that relate to human rights where positive and negative
externalities between states are rarer.
52
Yet in issues of human rights another problem may arise-the decisions of a
state may not represent the interests of all the state's citizens, but instead cater to
the interests of certain segments of society that possess greater political power.
53
In these situations, the decisions of states may not be optimal, either in terms of
morality or in terms of efficiency. However, for the Jury Theorem logic to work,
the states' decisions do not have to reach perfect results. As long as the decision of
the state is better than a coin toss, when deciding between two options, following
the decisions of a majority of states will lead to better results the larger the group
of states surveyed. While states often suffer from democratic failures that lead to
sub-optimal decision-making, their decisions are probably better than random in
most cases. States' decisions may be worse than random if they are all consistently
discriminating against a certain group. But even if one state discriminates against a
certain group, other states may not discriminate against the same group. Therefore,
the laws chosen by the majority of the states will not be systematically biased
against a certain group and the laws of each state will usually be better than a
random choice.
This part explores two other possible interests that can lead states to not
decide independently: states can try to learn from each other in order to adopt the
correct law even before the ECHR intervenes or states can try to conform in
advance to what they predict will be the Emerging Consensus discovered by the
ECHR in order to prevent the ECHR from finding them in violation of the
Convention. This part will also investigate ways that can allow the ECHR to shape
states' incentives so that they will be more likely to decide independently.
A. If States Want to Reach Correct Decisions Fast
If all states decide independently, the ECHR can apply Emerging Consensus
to reach the best legal rules. These rules can then be followed by all the states in
52. See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?,
16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 920 (2005).
53. See Benvenisti, supra note 32 (arguing that states may misrepresent minorities and prevent
them from having real political power); Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98
MicH. L. REV. 167 (1999) (arguing states can be captured by small and powerful interest groups); Shai
Dothan, In Defence of Expansive Interpretation in the ECHR, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. INT'L. & COMP. L 508
(2014) (arguing the ECHR is normatively justified in expansively interpreting the obligations of states
under the Convention, because the states' convention obligations do not necessarily reflect the views of
their citizens due to democratic failures).
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Europe. This process takes time, however, and may not be completed until several
years have passed. States take time to develop their legal systems and address new
issues and the ECHR takes time to issue its judgments and to discover an
Emerging Consensus. In the meantime, states may be faced with legal problems
that require an immediate solution. States can make the laws to address these
problems independently. If they do so, this will serve the European interest of
allowing the ECHR to learn from the independent choices of all European states. If
states decide independently, however, they will not learn from the experience of
other states and may reach inferior choices compared to the choices they would
have made if they used comparative law to learn from other European States.
States that decide independently may therefore be left with inferior legal regimes;
at least until the ECHR discovers an Emerging Consensus on this issue and the
states follow its judgment. If states care more about making the right legal choices
in the short term than about serving the long-term European interest, they will use
comparative law to learn from the states around them and will not decide
independently. If many states do not decide independently, the ECHR would not
be able to use Emerging Consensus to reach good legal rules. Furthermore, states
that use comparative law to learn from each other may be learning from states that
did not decide independently themselves and were subject to informational
cascades.
The ECHR can try to mitigate this problem by giving states an incentive to
decide independently and wait for its implementation of Emerging Consensus.
One way to do that is by accelerating the decision-making process within the
ECHR. If states know that the ECHR is likely to set the new doctrine by Emerging
Consensus very quickly, they may be more willing to settle for the inferior
solutions they can reach independently in the interim, since these solutions can
soon be replaced by the superior doctrine set by the ECHR. Yet this solution may
be practically difficult because the ECHR needs to handle a very large number of
cases54 and because it may require time to conduct a careful comparative research.
Another problem which may arise is that new legal problems may not be resolved
by all states at the same time, which means the ECHR may need to wait until
enough states have made their own choice regarding the issue before it can set a
clear, consensual doctrine.
Another practical way to increase the willingness of states to decide
independently is to show the states that the ability of the ECHR to use comparative
law is vastly superior to their own. If states are convinced that when the ECHR
finds Emerging Consensus, it uses comparative law in a professional manner that
ensures the best legal rule will be adopted, they may be more willing to decide
independently, knowing that their legal solutions will be replaced by the best
possible legal rule once the ECHR makes its decision. National courts that apply
54. Despite the fact that the ECHR accelerated its disposal of cases, which allowed it to decrease
its backlog of pending cases in 2013, the backlog still remained close to a hundred thousand cases at the
end of that year. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2013, at 4
(2014) available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats analysis_2013_ENG.pdf.
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comparative law need to conduct expensive research. If they are convinced that
the ECHR can undertake this research better than they can, and that they will
eventually be able to learn from its superior decisions, they may make an
independent decision and avoid the costs of comparative research.
The ECHR may be concerned that if it finds a state in violation of the
Convention that state would fail to comply with the judgment or severely criticize
the court. In extreme situations, the state may even attempt to change the
Convention or to leave the court's jurisdiction.55  Similarly, the court may be
concerned that deciding against the current of public opinion would damage its
public support within European states, which, in turn, would make future state
actions against the court easier.56 These fears may lead the ECHR to delay a
violation finding against the state for years, until the issue becomes less salient or
until the relevant state and the public within it view such a decision more
favorably.57 In the meantime, states that do not use comparative law may be stuck
with an inferior regime and thereby incentivized not to decide independently.
The formal rules of the Convention do not allow the ECHR to avoid deciding
cases, except under certain technical conditions that usually assure the case does
not concern a severe violation of human rights.58 But the ECHR can still decide
not to decide a case by determining that it lacks jurisdiction over it.59  By
strategically manipulating the rules of jurisdiction, the ECHR can avoid dealing
with sensitive issues until it feels it can do so with little fear of backlash. For
example, in the 2001 Bankovic case,60 the applicants argued that seventeen
55. See Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT'L
L. 631, 656-68 (2005); Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 48
VA. J. INT'L L. 411, 420-26 (2008); see also SHAI DOTHAN, REPUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS: A
THEORY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS, 87-102 (2015) (discussing harmful responses
that states can use against international courts when they disagree with their judgments).
56. See Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 411, 418-19 (2013) (showing how public support for the ECHR in the
United Kingdom has declined in response to controversial judgments it issued, facilitating actions
against the court).
57. See Shai Dothan, How International Courts Enhance their Legitimacy, 14 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 455,475 (2013).
58. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 35(3),
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 [hereinafter Convention] ("The Court shall declare inadmissible any
individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that: a. the application is incompatible
with the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of
the right of individual application; or b. the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless
respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination
of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not
been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.").
59. See Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Orders,
in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 3, 4 (Helen Keller
& Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008) (stressing that the ECHR decides the scope of its own jurisdiction, a
power referred to as Kompetenz-Kompetenz).
60. Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001 -XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333.
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European states that were members of NATO61 violated the Convention by killing
civilians in a NATO airstrike in Yugoslavia.62 The ECHR decided that it did not
have jurisdiction to decide the case because the attack took place outside of the
territories of states that were members of the Convention.63
This decision was severely criticized as digressing from the court's previous
judgments on the issue of jurisdiction.64 Only ten years after Bankovic, in the Al-
Skeinl6 5 and AI-Jedda66 judgments, the ECHR reverted to its old doctrine on
extraterritorial jurisdiction and decided that states which exercise control over
territories that do not belong to any Convention state are nonetheless subject to the
ECHR's jurisdiction.67 Al-Skeini and AI-Jedda dealt with violations of human
rights committed by British forces in occupied Iraq.68  The ECHR may have
reasoned that criticizing military actions in Iraq in 2011 would lead to much less
resistance than criticizing the actions of NATO in Yugoslavia in 2001, both
because in 2011 public opinion shifted strongly against the war in Iraq, and
because in 2001 public opinion supported the use of military force due to the
beginning of the War on Terror.69 However, the result of this strategy, besides the
harmful ambiguity that it added to the ECHR's doctrines on jurisdiction, is that the
states were deprived of the guidance of the ECHR on extra-territorial military
actions for a whole decade. This gave states an incentive to look around them and
to try to learn from the other states how to shape their policy on the issue instead of
deciding independently.
Another possibility available for the ECHR in such sensitive cases is to tweak
its decision and digress from the true Emerging Consensus so as not to find states
in violation and not to provoke them into harming the court. However, this may
lead the ECHR to adopt doctrines that are inferior to the genuine application of
Emerging Consensus, thereby giving states an incentive not to wait for its decision
and to use comparative law to adopt good policies by themselves.
The Margin of Appreciation doctrine applied by the ECHR can sometimes
mitigate these problems. According to this doctrine, the ECHR allows the states
61. These states were Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and
the United Kingdom. Id. 13.
62. Id. 128.
63. Id. 11 54-82.
64. See Alexandra Ruth & Mija Trilsch, Bankovic v. Belgium (Admissibility), 97 AM. J. INT'L L
168, 172 (2003); Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the
Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 529, 545 (2003).
Previous ECHR judgments on extraterritorial jurisdiction include: Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary
Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23-24 (1995); Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2234-35;
Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 25.
65. AI-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 (2011).
66. AI-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 789 (2011).
67. See Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. Jil 130-50; Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1174-86.
68. AI-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. Jill 33-71;A1-Jedda, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. J l 8-15.
69. See How International Courts Enhance their Legitimacy, supra note 57, at 475-76.
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some leeway in making their own policies without finding them in violation.70
This doctrine allows the ECHR to indicate that a European consensus has emerged
and to offer to the states a rule that they can follow, while at the same time
avoiding a direct finding of violation against the state whose conduct is in
question. Because the ECHR avoids finding the state in violation when it grants
the states a Margin of Appreciation, it is less likely to provoke the state into
undertaking harmful responses against it. This increases the willingness of the
ECHR to give its judgment, indicating what is the Emerging Consensus, earlier.
Consequently, states that expect the ECHR to decide quickly and provide them
with guidance would be more willing to make their policies independently.
Similarly, the ability to avoid harmful responses by states by granting them a
Margin of Appreciation allows the ECHR to identify the true European consensus
without manipulating it, thereby reaching the optimal rule and giving states a




While a quick and high-quality decision by the ECHR applying Emerging
Consensus may incentivize states to decide independently, it may also damage
states' incentives to invest in adopting good legal rules. Since the states know that
the ECHR will soon provide them with good legal solutions, they may rationally
decide not to invest resources in finding the best legal solutions on their own.
States may decide to cut the budgets of national courts and transfer the resources
they need to make good laws elsewhere. If all states make this rational calculation
and do not invest the necessary resources to adopt good laws, the ECHR will
follow a majority of states, each of which has a relatively low probability of
reaching the correct result. Yet as long as the states' decision is better than a
random decision, the majority of a substantial group of states, such as the forty-
seven states of the Council of Europe, will still reach the correct result with a high
probability.
If the analysis undertaken here is widely accepted, then national courts that
use comparative law instead of making independent decisions will be branded as
damaging the general European interest. This can damage the legitimacy of these
national courts in the eyes of other courts. In order to avoid this damage to their
international legitimacy, national courts may stop using comparative law, even if
this means they will adopt inferior laws.
In a recent empirical study, Laurence Helfer and Erik Voeten find evidence
that the ECHR tracks the policy of the majority of states in Europe regarding the
protection of people with minority sexual orientations.72 Their research suggests
that states often change their policies by following the judgments of the ECHR
70. See Dickson v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, Ji 41, 77-78.
71. See Shai Dothan, Why Granting States a Margin of Appreciation Supports the Formation of a
Genuine European Consensus (unpublished draft) (on file with the author) (suggesting that granting
states a Margin of Appreciation, even when doing so would lead to bad policy outcomes in specific
cases, can help create the appropriate preconditions for the formation of a genuine European
consensus).
72. Heifer & Voeten, supra note 28, at 106.
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instead of following what seems to be the majority of the other states in Europe
prior to the ECHR's judgment.73 This study provides some evidence that the
ECHR applies emerging consensus properly by following the majority of states. It
also supports the conclusion that states acknowledge this fact and are consequently
willing to decide independently until the ECHR makes its judgment, exposes the
emerging consensus, and allows the states to follow it.
B. If States Fear Overruling by the ECHR
When the ECHR finds that a state violated the Convention, this state suffers a
reputational damage. When the reputation of a state is damaged, other states view
it as more willing to disregard its international commitments. The state may partly
rebuild its reputation by complying with the judgment of the ECHR but some
damage to its reputation may remain.74 States may want to avoid this reputational
damage and try to prevent a decision that they violated the Convention. The states
can expect that the ECHR will use Emerging Consensus to determine which states
do not conform to the European consensus and find these states in violation of the
Convention. In order to prevent a finding of violation against them, states may try
to predict what doctrine the ECHR will discover by Emerging Consensus and
conform to it in advance, before the ECHR has a chance to make its decision. In
that case, states will not make law independently. Instead, they will try to foresee
what the majority of European states will set as the law and conform to this
standard.
States that try to foresee the emergence of a consensus will not make the law
which they think is best; instead, they may try to foresee what the majority of
states will think is the best law. However, all states are expected to make the same
calculation and conform to what they think the majority think is the best law. As a
result, the states would try to predict not what the majority of states think is the
best law, but instead what the majority of states think that the majority of states
think is the best law. This attempt to foresee what other states that behave
strategically will do, which was termed "Beauty Contest" after a similar metaphor
used by Keynes, can be extended infinitely. 75 The majority of states may end up
coordinating in this process of prediction around certain legal solutions that most
of the states would deem inferior if they made an independent decision.
73. Id.
74. See REPUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS: A THEORY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
COURTS, supra note 55 (analyzing the reputational incentives of the states facing judgments by
international courts); Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights, 12 CHI. J.
INT'L. L. 115, 118-19 (2011).
75. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND
MONEY 156 (1936) (describing a contest in which readers of a newspaper must vote for the six prettiest
photographs from a group of a hundred photographs of women and win a prize if they choose the
photographs chosen by the majority of readers; in such a situation readers do not decide according to
their own perceptions of beauty but rather according to what the majority thinks that the majority thinks
is beautiful).
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In such a scenario, it is possible that states would choose legal solutions
because they appear unique in a certain sense and therefore can serve as focal
points for coordination.7 6 As an example, if one state significantly improves the
status of transsexuals, this decision may appear very salient precisely because it
cuts against the laws of most European states. This salience makes it likely that
each state will expect all the others to conform to this new law, which will lead, in
turn, to a decision by the ECHR that this is the Emerging Consensus. States may
therefore change their laws and grant the same rights to transsexuals to avoid a
finding of violation against them. Absurdly, states adopted this legal solution
precisely because it is salient and it gained its salience by cutting against what the
majority of states would prefer if they made an independent decision.
If states behave in this manner, the ECHR will not be able to find the best
legal solution by following the majority of the states. The ECHR must therefore
attempt to alleviate the fear of states that it will find them in violation of the
Convention if they fail to discern and to conform in advance to an Emerging
Consensus. One way the ECHR can accomplish that is by not finding a state in
violation before issuing a warning in a judgment that an Emerging Consensus has
formed and future deviations from it would lead to a ruling against the states. If
states know they will not be subject to a severe reputational sanction if they fail to
predict the elusive European consensus, and they will receive a fair warning in
case their conduct does not conform to it before finding a violation, they will be
more likely to stick to their sincere choices of the best legal rules. Sincere and
independent choices by the states will allow the ECHR to learn profitably from the
states' decision-making when it uses Emerging Consensus. After the ECHR issued
a warning and gave states enough time to change their laws accordingly, it may
start to find states that do not conform to its rulings in violation of the Convention.
The series of ECHR judgments that indicated disagreement with the United
Kingdom's practices regarding transsexuals many years before the United
Kingdom was found in violation may have served as such a mechanism of
warning. In the Rees case,77 decided in 1986, the ECHR decided that the practice
of issuing transsexuals a birth certificate which includes their sex at birth and
preventing them from marrying a person of their opposite current sex does not
violate the Convention.78 Yet already in this judgment the ECHR indicated that it
was aware of the suffering of transsexuals and called for a review of the legal
provisions in light of scientific and societal changes.79 Over the next fifteen years,
the ECHR issued increasingly severe criticism of the United Kingdom that warned
an Emerging Consensus was forming against its practices. In the Cossey case8 ° the
ECHR pointed again to the seriousness of the problems faced by transsexuals and
to the need to keep the issue under review;
8' in the Sheffield and Horsham case
82
76. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 94 (1963).
77. Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) Jill 44-47 (1986).
78. Id. I 46.
79. Id. 47.
80. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) [[42 (1990).
81. Id.
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the ECHR indicated a growing displeasure with the United Kingdom's practices.83
Furthermore, the court stressed in this judgment that only four out of thirty-seven
European states studied prevented the reassignment of sex in birth certificates,
indicating a clear Emerging Consensus against the United Kingdom, but still not
finding it in violation of the Convention.84  Finally, after warning the United
Kingdom for about fifteen years that its practices digressed from the Emerging
Consensus, the ECHR decided that the United Kingdom's system of birth
certificates and marriage regulation violated the Convention in the Goodwin case,
85
decided in 2002.86
The Margin of Appreciation doctrine can help the ECHR to issue a warning to
the state that its practices contradict the European Consensus without finding it in
violation. If the court rules that the state's behavior contradicts the European
Consensus, but its actions should be granted deference based on the Margin of
Appreciation doctrine, it does not brand the state as a violator of its commitments.
Therefore, the state would not suffer significant reputational damage and it would
receive a fair warning that in the future, similar conduct may lead to a finding of
violation.
This suggests that the boundaries of the Margin of Appreciation should be
broadened compared to the boundaries that should be set if states are considered
not to respond strategically to the ECHR's judgments. Even if the ECHR is
convinced that the European consensus reflects a superior policy to the policy
adopted by the state it should sometimes grant states a Margin of Appreciation, as
a way to alleviate their fear of being found in violation in case they do not conform
to the European consensus prior to the court's ruling and to give states an incentive
to decide independently.
87
VII. How STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR BY THE ECHR CAN INTERFERE
National courts that apply comparative law are often accused of not really
attempting to discover the laws of the majority of states on which to base their
decisions, but rather making their decision for their own reasons and afterwards
using states with similar laws to support that decision.88 Similar accusations can
easily be lodged against an international court such as the ECHR. If the judges
look only at a biased sample of the states, their decision will not enjoy the
informational benefits of the Jury Theorem.
82. Sheffield v. United Kingdom, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 84.
83. Id. 1160.
84. See id. Jill 20-37.
85. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 26, 1104.
86. See Beate Rudolf, Constitutional Developments-European Court of Human Rights: Legal
Status of Postoperative Transsexuals, I.INT'L J. CON. L. 716 (2003) (providing more information on
this development).
87. See Why Granting States a Margin of Appreciation Supports the Formation of a Genuine
European Consensus, supra note 71.
88. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003). See also Posner & Sunstein, supra
note 1, at 138-39.
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One way to address this problem is to try to limit the discretion the ECHR
judges have when they choose the states from which they learn under Emerging
Consensus. If judges cannot choose the states to which they refer and if they study
the laws of these states correctly, then their judgments will accurately reflect the
collective wisdom of the states instead of their own discretion. A simple way to
limit the judges' discretion is to direct them to survey the laws of all the states in
Europe when they engage in Emerging Consensus. This may be practically
difficult, however. There are currently forty-seven states in the European Council
and studying all of their laws carefully may prove too much of a burden for the
ECHR, which operates under a severe resource constraint.89 As Part V argued, the
ECHR can make good decisions with limited resources if it will ignore the laws of
some states or give them only a lower weight compared to the weight it gives to
other states.
ECHR judges can be prevented from cherry-picking the laws of states that
suit their own wishes even if they do not have to survey all states, but only a
certain predetermined group of states. Part V suggested several characteristics of
states to whose practices the ECHR should give greater weight in its decision-
namely, states that are especially successful, democratic and populous. If a group
of states with these attributes is identified, the ECHR can gain a great amount of
information at a comparatively low cost by looking only to the laws of these states.
States that are excluded from this group, however, will view the ECHR as biased
against them and may fiercely resist this policy. This policy may therefore be
impossible because the ECHR is concerned with preserving the support of all the
states in Europe. The ECHR may want to stress that the group of states that it
looks to is diversified and includes states from different systems, which accurately
represent all the states in Europe. To the extent that the ECHR can do this
credibly, it may thwart some accusations of bias, but choosing these representative
states may be very difficult. There is also another problem-the successful states
to which the ECHR looks may simply be too different from the other states to
render learning from them a useful exercise. The Jury Theorem only supports
Emerging Consensus when states are similar. When states are different, even if
they possess excellent decision-making skills, their policies should not be followed
by the rest of Europe.
An alternative way to address this problem may try to identify the true
reasons behind the ECHR decision-making. If the real motivations that make the
ECHR decide in a certain way are discovered, doctrinal mechanisms can try to
counter these motivations to the extent that they make the ECHR abandon the
correct application of Emerging Consensus. The literature regarding judicial
behavior distinguishes between three types of theories:
1. Legal Models-judges try to uphold the law in their judgments;
2. Attitudinal Models-judges follow their own policy preferences;
89. See ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2013, supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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3. Strategic Models-judges try to promote their policy preferences
strategically, by changing their behavior to counter the expected
responses of other actors.
9
0
This paper will briefly address each of these theories and try to suggest
methods to prevent the ECHR, if it acts under each of these theories, from
subverting the informational benefits gained from Emerging Consensus.
A. Legal Models
According to legal models, judges apply the law as accurately as they can
without serving any policy preferences.91 The main challenge that the proponents
of this model face is defining the law that judges apply in their judgments. The
ECHR is tasked with applying the Convention. Yet, the ECHR has often indicated
that it will apply the rules of the Convention in an evolutionary manner92 and try to
effectively protect the rights enshrined in it. 93  The ECHR also applies a
teleological interpretation that looks to the object and purpose of the Convention
and not only to its text.94 Although these doctrines give the ECHR substantial
discretion, the text of the Convention guides the ECHR in its judgment, and this
guidance may sometimes contradict the European consensus on certain issues.
Consequently, if the ECHR follows the legal model, it may follow the text of the
Convention instead of the views of the majority of states at the time of the
judgment. The text of the Convention may only reflect the views of the states in
the past, when they joined the convention system. In the meantime, the views of
the majority of the states may have changed or adapted to changing circumstances,
but due to the requirement that every amendment of the Convention (as opposed to
additions to it, which can be accomplished by an additional protocol) requires the
unanimous support of the states, the text of the Convention may remain the same. 
95
Moreover, states may have ratified the Convention for ulterior reasons or agreed to
certain provisions only as a compromise in return for other benefits.96 In these
90. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 44-114 (2002).
91. See Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do with It?: Judicial Behavioralists Test the "Legal
Model" of Judicial Decision Making, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 485-86 (2001) (presenting two views
of legal models: the first views the law as an effective constraint on judges that makes their judgments
accurately conform to the law, the second views judges as trying to honestly apply the law as they
perceive it to be). My focus here is on the first interpretation since my paper is focused on the actual
content ofjudgments and not on the perceptions ofjudges.
92. See Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 31, 1115-16 (1978).
93. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R 34, 1188 1989).
94. See Franqois Ost, The Original Canons of Interpretation of the European Court of Human
Rights, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 283, 292 (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1992)
95. See Defence of Expansive Interpretation in the ECHR, supra note 53, at 519.
96. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 168. See also ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS-FROM ITS INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A
PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 92-93, 95, 100 (2010) (arguing states concerned with
maintaining their sovereignty, primarily the United Kingdom, used the attempt to reach unanimity in
VOL. 43:1
THE OPTIMAL USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW
situations, the judges who follow the legal model and apply the text of the
Convention instead of learning from the current choices of states will not gain the
decisional benefits of the Jury Theorem.
However, the behavior of judges who apply the legal model can easily be
corrected by changing the Convention. If the Convention is amended to include a
specific requirement that judges apply Emerging Consensus, then legalist judges
will follow this requirement and reap the benefits of the Jury Theorem. While the
ECHR is not formally bound to its previous judgments, it has often indicated that it
will not digress from them without good reason.97 If judges follow this accepted
doctrine, even a series of judgments that indicates the importance of applying
Emerging Consensus can improve the chances of its use by legalist judges.
B. Attitudinal Models
According to attitudinal models, judges have certain policy preferences that
they follow in their judgments." While, according to attitudinal models, the law
itself can have an effect on the result, these models claim that judges make some
choices based on considerations of policy.99 These choices cannot be easily
manipulated by changing the Convention or the content of the court's judgments.
However, those who select the judges may select them based on the policies they
will promote on the bench. Therefore, the rules that determine the selection of
judges to the ECHR and to the panels on the court can shape the court's judgments
in a direction that supports the Jury Theorem logic.
According to the current rules on the selection of judges to the ECHR, each
state in the European Council submits a list of three candidates to become ECHR
judges to the European Parliamentary Assembly, which selects one judge from the
list. 00 If states only select candidates whose policy preferences fully concur with
their own,'0' then the judges on the ECHR should accurately represent he views of
the states in Europe. In that case, the majority of the judges on the court shall
enjoy the same decision-making benefit as the majority of the states. However,
since judges make decisions in panels which are supposedly random, besides one
judge who sits in respect to the state whose conduct is in question,0 2 there is some
the negotiations prior to the first signing of the Convention to impose a relatively weak and partial
version of the Convention on the majority of the states).
97. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 26, 1 74.
98. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 90 at 86.
99. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156 (1998).
100. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 20, 22, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ..
101. See Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court
of Human Rights, 102 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 417, 431 (2008) (providing evidence ECHR judges
sometimes act as policy seekers and their policy views may be foreseeable by the selecting states).
Realistically speaking, states probably cannot select judges that concur with their policy views on every
possible issue. The issues under the ECHR's jurisdiction are simply too numerous and complex to
expect that a qualified candidate would correspond to her state's views on every point. Yet states may
certainly foresee the candidates' policy views on some key issues and select hem accordingly.
102. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 26(4), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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uncertainty whether the result reached by the panel will reflect the views of the
majority of judges on the court. As the size of the panel increases this uncertainty
would decrease since the majority of judges on the panel would be more likely to
reflect the majority of judges on the court. 103 Therefore, to the extent that judges
make decisions based on policy preferences and to the extent that the states select
judges that concur with their preferences, the ECHR should prefer to decide as
many cases as possible in the Grand Chamber, consisting of seventeen judges,
instead of in smaller panels, such as Chambers of seven judges, three judges
Committees and single judges Formations. However, the more judges who sit on
the panel, the greater the costs in judicial time of each judgment. This policy
recommendation can therefore put another strain on the ECHR's resources. The
limited resources of the ECHR are the reason that Protocol 14, which went into
force in 2010, amended the Convention furthering precisely the opposite policy-
shifting greater responsibilities to smaller panels. 104
C. Strategic Models
Strategic models include every theory that claims courts change their
decisions strategically in order to counter the expected responses of other actors.1
0 5
The final result that the court wants to achieve by its strategic behavior may vary
from one theory to another.'°6 It is possible, for instance, that the ECHR wants all
states to follow the Emerging Consensus in Europe, but is afraid that if it issues a
judgment based on Emerging Consensus some states may fail to comply. In that
case, the ECHR may conclude that states' actions would come as close as possible
to following Emerging Consensus if its judgment would reflect a compromise.
The ECHR may issue a judgment that does not follow Emerging Consensus fully
but comes close to its prescriptions if it is more likely to be complied with than a
judgment that follows exactly the doctrine.
Under these conditions, the best way to ensure that the ECHR decides based
on Emerging Consensus is to remove the fear of noncompliance that motivates its
strategic behavior. For example, if the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe, which is tasked with enforcing the ECHR's judgments,10 7 would grow in
efficiency and power, it could reduce the fear that states would fail to comply with
ECHR judgments. This would give the strategic court a reason to decide based on
Emerging Consensus alone without any strategic compromise. Similarly, if states
expect a substantial reputational sanction for noncompliance, they would be more
likely to comply and a strategic ECHR would, in turn, be more likely to adhere to
103. See Menachem Mautner, Luck in Courts, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 217, 224 (2007).
104. See European Convention on Human Rights Protocol 14, May 13, 2004, C.E.T.S. 194.
(Protocol 14 allowed Committees of three judges to declare admissible and decide on the merits cases
that are clearly well founded; it also allowed single-judge formations to reject clearly inadmissible
cases).
105. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Political (Science) Context of
Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 783, 798 (2003).
106. See id.
107. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 46(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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Emerging Consensus without strategically deviating from it.'0 8 Furthermore,
improving the chances of compliance would also serve the ultimate end of making
states behave according to Emerging Consensus.
It is possible that the ECHR serves other goals besides promoting the
adherence of states to Emerging Consensus and does so strategically. In that case,
different systems to constrain the ECHR's decision-making may theoretically be
used to increase the chances that it would conform to Emerging Consensus.
VIII.CONCLUSION
This paper argues that if Emerging Consensus is applied correctly by the
ECHR, it can lead to better legal results than the application of comparative law by
national courts. Emerging Consensus allows the ECHR to learn from the
experience gained by national legal systems. As long as national courts that set the
law in European states decide independently, they can enjoy the benefit of an
informed decision by the ECHR without falling prey to information cascades that
plague the use of comparative law by national courts. If states-or the ECHR
itself-follow their own interests and digress from the prescriptions of the theory
described here, doctrinal and practical solutions can be devised to counter these
tendencies and increase the chances that states and the ECHR would follow the
prescriptions of the theory.
The ECHR's unique institutional position allows the formulation of rules for
judicial decision-making that can be followed equally by all national courts and
still lead to the adoption of good laws. The paper argues that national courts
should decide independently from each other, but should follow the ECHR's
judgments if they either find certain practices in violation of the Convention or
warn that such a finding is imminent in the future. This may be just one example
of a situation in which international courts can help to overcome problems of
decision-making by national courts. International courts may draw information
from other sources besides national courts, such as from Non-Governmental
Organizations or their own professional research. After consulting information
from multiple sources, some of which are inaccessible to national courts, these
international courts can make an informed decision that the states under their
jurisdiction and their courts should follow.
Just as the ECHR's position as a supranational court gives it-advantages in
decision-making over national courts, federal courts may have a similar advantage
over state courts. The analysis in the paper suggests that when federal courts, such
as the United States Supreme Court, learn from the laws of the states within the
federation they can provide the entire federal system with the decisional benefits of
the Jury Theorem. Federal courts can do that without requiring the states within
108. See Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 74 (arguing if the
ECHR would have a high judicial reputation this would improve the chances of compliance by states
and would, in turn, allow the ECHR a greater ability to pursue its preferences).
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the federation to learn from each other's laws and to inevitably cascade one after
the other.'0 9
The paper also demonstrates the benefits that international courts generally
can gain by learning from national courts and their collective experience. Other
international courts, such as the International Court of Justice or the International
Criminal Court may also gain these benefits if they use comparative law and learn
from the vast experience of national courts across the world. This paper therefore
joins the international law theorists who argue that using comparative law is
beneficial, yet it suggests that it is international, regional, or federal courts that can
optimally use comparative law, not national courts.
109. See State Law as "Other Law" Our Fifty Sovereigns In the Federal Constitutional Canon, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1671 (2007) (showing the United States Supreme Court learns from state laws as
it develops its doctrines).
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